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Abstract. Visual cryptography (VC) encodes an image into noise-like shares, which can be 
stacked to reveal a reduced quality version of the original.  The problem with encrypting 
colour images is that they must undergo heavy pre-processing to reduce them to binary, en-
tailing significant quality loss.  This paper proposes VC that works directly on intermediate 
grayscale values per colour channel and demonstrates real-valued basis matrices for this pur-
pose.  The resulting stacked shares produce a clearer reconstruction than in binary VC, and to 
the best of the authors’ knowledge, is the first method posing no restrictions on colour values 
while maintaining the ability to decrypt with human vision.  Grayscale and colour images of 
differing entropies are encrypted using fuzzy OR and XOR, and their PSNR and structural 
similarities are compared with binary VC to demonstrate improved quality.  It is compared 
with previous research and its advantages highlighted, notably in high quality reconstructions 
with minimal processing. 
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1 Introduction 
Conventional cryptography relies on key distribution to valid participants, but two 
versions of a new cryptographic paradigm were created in 1987 by Kafri and Keren 
[Kafri, 87] and 1994 by Naor and Shamir [Naor, 94], that do not rely on such public 
and private keys.  These methods, respectively random grids and visual cryptography 
(VC), are types of visual secret sharing (VSS), which encodes a secret binary image 
into a set of shadow images, or shares, such that stacking a qualified subset of them 
reveals a reduced quality version of the original secret.  These shares form an access 
structure, containing qualified and forbidden combinations. 
Shadow images comprise random sequences of black and white (or transparent) 
pixels.  As such, they are indistiguishable from random noise, making it impossible 
for forbidden subsets to decode the secret.  Therefore, not only does VSS eliminate 
key distribution, but it exhibits perfect information theoretic security.  The work of 
Ateniese, et al. [Ateniese, 96:2] proposed methods, such as cumulative array, for con-
structing schemes for any access structure.  However, they yielded far from optimal 
reconstructed image quality (i.e. contrast), leading to years of research into this prob-
lem, such as that of [Arumugam, 12], who improved the contrast of a particular type 
of general access structure, and [Liu, 10], who built large access structures from 
smaller ones. 
The major drawback is that only black and white images can be directly encoded.  
Grayscale and colour images must first undergo pre-processing (in the form of error-
diffusion and colour decomposion, as in [Duraisamy, 13]), to reduce them to binary 
form.  Even the best error-diffusion algorithms, such as Floyd-Steinberg [Floyd, 76] 
produce lossy images, leaking information from the image.  When the shares of a VC 
scheme are combined in the decryption phase, the result is a highly lossy version of 
the original secret image, therefore conventional (binary) visual cryptography entails 
two stages of quality loss.  Although much prior work exists in colour VC, the range 
of colours is limited either by definition or by large resulting pixel expansions. 
In this paper, a novel VC method, real-valued visual cryptography (RVC), is 
presentated that encodes grayscale and colour values directly into the VC scheme, 
eliminating quality loss emerging from error-diffusion and bringing about clearer 
reconstructions than previously achieved using methods that permit decryption using 
both human vision or computation.  The latter entails low computational cost fuzzy, 
as opposed to binary, operations for decrypting the secret, and to the best of the au-
thors’ knowledge, is the first VSS proposal that removes all colour restrictions and 
error-diffusion requirements in such a cryptographic method.  Furthermore, pixel 
exansions are improved versus prior methods.  For example, a pixel expansion of four 
is demonstrated in Section 5 for a 10-colour scheme.  Existing VSS methodologies 
are explored and redefined to relax requirements to real-valued (i.e. grayscale) input 
and output.  The contributions presented herein are: 
 
 A new version of VC – RVC – that eliminates image pre-processing re-
quirements while maintaining the theoretical ability to physically stack 
shares for visual decryption. 
 Redefinition of contrast calculation. 
 Fuzzy decryption operations. 
 A simulated annealing method or the construction of RVC schemes. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:  Section 3 provides the back-
ground to Naor-Shamir VC.  Section 4.1 formulates the mapping of RGB values onto 
basis matrix values. In Section 4.2, contrast calculation is redefined for real-valued 
schemes, and Section 4.3 likewise redefines the operations required for decryption.  In 
Section 4.4, RVC scheme construction is described, and Section 5 gives the results of 
encryption and decryption for grayscale and colour images of various entropies and 
colour distributions.  There is also a comparative analysis with various prior works in 
the field.  Finally, Section 6 concludes the study and proposes further research direc-
tions, notably the new mathematical challenges that this innovation presents. 
2 Related Work 
2.1 Binary Visual Secret Sharing 
Although Naor and Shamir’s original work on VC remains a popular VSS method-
ology, they were mindful of the contrast loss problem using the OR operation for 
reconstruction and wrote a follow-up paper proposing a “Cover semi-group” [Naor, 
96].   However, they conceded the impossibility of building any (k, n) access struc-
tures for 3k n  , thus limiting its applicability.  They also expressed concern over 
its inability to conceal colour images. 
In the same year, [Ateniese, 96:2] proposed the cumulative array method for con-
structing VC basis matrices (which are used to encode secret pixels into shares) from 
( , )
M M
Z Z  access structures, where 
M
Z  is the set of maximal forbidden subsets of 
participants.  Although it is easily applicable to any required access structure, the 
resulting pixel expansion, hence contrast (given their mutual inverse proportionality) 
is far from optimal.  For instance, a (3, 6)-VC scheme (VCS) produces pixel expan-
sion 25.  However, it is shown in [Hofmeister, 00] that the optimal value is 10. 
In 2004, [Yang, 04] devised the first VC method without pixel expansion applica-
ble to any access structure.  The method relies on probabilistically setting share pixels 
to black or white, such that the mean count of black-representative pixels in the re-
construction is higher than for white-representative pixels.  This probabilistic VC 
(PVC) is distinguished from conventional, or deterministic VC (DVC), in its use of 
random numbers to select individual share pixel values.  Whereas the reconstruction 
contrasts of DVC can be easily and precisely calculated (see equation (2)), those in 
PVC are not.  Moreover, constrasts resulting from the original PVC work were lower 
than for DVC.  However, more recent work, such as that of [Wang, 11], has consider-
ably improved it.  Indeed, their work introduces the concept of a user-defined pixel 
expansion. 
2.2 Colour Visual Secret Sharing 
The first to study colour VSS was [Verheul, 97], who considered a secret pixel of 
colour 
i
c , where the permitted number of colours is c, and 0 1i c   .  They consid-
ered the result of stacking coloured share pixels as a “generalized colour”, where the 
presence of a black pixel results in a black reconstruction, and all concurrent pixels of 
the same colour produce that colour in the reconstruction.  Additionally, they provide 
a construction method resulting in c basis matrices, each element of which is an inte-
ger in {0,..., 1}c  . 
A method with improved contrast was devised by [Blundo, 01], who used c-colour 
(2, n) and (n, n) schemes, with the requirement (proof given in their paper) that c n .  
They provide two algorithms, one yielding optimal pixel expansion with maximal 
contrast, the other yielding a trade-off between these metrics.  Pixel expansions in 
those works are still high, and image preprocessing is still required.  Interestingly, an 
earlier work [Koga, 98] devised a simple method, again using c colours, using a col-
our lattice comprising additive and subtractive models.  They construct basis matrices 
with pixel expansion 1nm ck   for (n, n)-VCS, i.e. the conventional optimal pixel 
expansion multiplied by the number of colours.  They achieve this by concatenating 
combinations of black- and white-representative conventional basis matrices and sub-
stituting white share pixels (i.e., zeros) with the required colours.  However, their 
method is limited to (n, n)-VCS. 
In [Adhikari, 05], the ratio of correctly reconstructed pixels was increased com-
pared to [Koga, 98].  The method entailed either one of two colour sets, {C, M, Y} or 
{C, M, Y, R, G, B}, each colour requiring its own basis matrix.  A further c-colour 
methods are provided by [Cimato, 05], followed up by [Cimato, 07], who demonstrate 
3-colour schemes and compute a lower pixel expansion bound of 12 1n c  .  
Although such methods use mutli-value basis matrices, the preferred technique 
amongst researchers, such as [Chen, 11] and [Wu, 13] is a combination of halftoning 
and colour decomposition.  Here, a colour image is decomposed into its three base 
colours (either additive or subtractive), and each of them is treated as an independent 
grayscale image.  The gray levels are diffused into binary form using an error-
diffusion algorithm such as Floyd-Steinberg.  For example, [Hou, 03] decomposed 
colour pixels to their C, M and Y components before encoding using 2 2  colour 
blocks comprising the subtractive colours, white and black. 
Colour decomposition is applicable to any type of VSS.  The shares are constructed 
by recomposing the colours, and [Wu, 13] produced arguably the best colour image 
reconstruction using this and void-and-cluster in their recent work.  However, infor-
mation is inevitably lost in the necessary reduction to binary values.  This is particu-
larly deleterious when sharing high-entropy images, as further information is lost in 
the VSS encoding. 
More recently, [Christy, 15] used a stochastic method, in the form of a feed-
forward artificial neuron network, to generate extended VC schemes.  In such 
schemes, the shares themselves take on the appearance of cover images, detracting 
attention from hackers who might be curious about the meaning and purpose of purely 
noise-like shares.  Although they achieved a little higher than 41 peak-to-signal noise-
ratio, they do preprocess the image to reduce each channel to binary form. 
Interestingly, [Sugawari, 15] also recently developed a new colour VC method 
without the need for preprocessing, but it does not involve simple transparent shares 
or computational stacking, but high-order retarder films.  Conventional retarder films, 
commonly used to bring about three-dimensional cinematography, rotate polarized 
light by fixed angles.  However [Sugawari, 15] propose arbitrary angle rotation to 
create colour VC shares. 
All of the aforementioned research falls under the category of visual secret sharing, 
as decryption can be carried out visually and computationally.  Many purely computa-
tional methods have also been developed, such as [Lukac, 05], who encypted colour 
pixel values as numeric data, requiring conversion to binary and simple binary opera-
tions to combine shares.  Although this and similar methods produce lossless recon-
struction, they are examples of visual secret sharing, due to lack of ability to visually 
decode from stacking shares.. 
3 Naor-Shamir Visual Cryptography 
A secret binary image, , is encrypted  into set of n shadow images,  only 
qualified subsets of which can be printed onto transparencies and stacked to reveal  
' , a lossy reconstruction of the secret.  Subsets comprise superset ( ),qual forb    , 
where   is the access structure defining qualified and forbidden subsets, and  
qual forb   .  For simplicity, { : , }forb qualX X X    .  Access structures 
can be threshold or general.  The latter explicity defines each X  , whereas the 
former assumes { : }
qual
X X k   , producing threshold (k, n)-VCS. 
The procedure, given below, takes two collections of binary matrices, 
0 1,C C , form-
ing the basis of a scheme.  These are therefore referred to as basis matrices.  If 
, {0,1}S C ii i  , then all possible columns permutations of iS  comprise the respec-
tive collection.  In this paper, the collections are ignored in favour of referring directly 
to the basis matrices 
iS , with ~iS X  denoting that matrix X is equal to iS  up to col-
umn permutation. 
Each such matrix has dimensions n m , where m is the pixel expansion.  To en-
code a secret pixel, one member of 0C  or 1C  if selected if it is a white, resp. black, 
pixel.  To encode shadow 
j
, the jth row of 
iS  is selected and converted into a rec-
tangular matrix of “subpixels” whose dimensions are as close to each other as possi-
ble (ideally a square matrix, if m is a square number, thus retaining aspect ratio).  
Each secret pixel is replaced by these subpixel blocks to form shadow images, as in 
Figure 1.  Given that stacking is equivalent to binary OR, 1 ... n' =   .  Figure 1 
illustrates a simple (2, 2)-VCS.   
 
Figure 1:  Encryption and decryption of a (2, 2)-VCS 
Given contrast reduction and pixel expansion, a major challenge is the design of 
basis matrices that optimize these metrics.  A classical way to contruct them is via 
accumulative arrays [Ateniese, 96:2].  Although it is efficient and accurate, the CA 
method rarely results in optimal schemes, because impracticle pixel expansions arise 
with large k and n. 
4 Real-valued Visual Secret Sharing 
In this section, RVC scheme construction is demonstrated, along with the pre-
requisitives for encryption, decryption and calculation of contrast.  In 4.1, a simple 
equation is presented for converting grayscale or RGB values to real values.  In 4.2, 
the standard contrast calculation of binary VC is generalised for RVC.  As binary 
image decryption relies on binary operations for decryption, these are generalised to 
fuzzy operations in 4.3.  Finally, in 4.4, the RVC methodology is introduced. 
4.1 Mapping Real Values to Grayscale Colours 
For I  to be a valid input into a VSS scheme, it must be binary.  Error-diffusion 
methods can be used on grayscale (and colour) images, but signifant information is 
lost, as evidenced in Figure 2, below.  Furthermore, the result is a set of binary shares 
(i.e., each colour channel is binary), making it diffult to conceal additional “sublimi-
nal” messages in them using steganography. 
A.  B.   C.  
Figure 2:  A: Secret image, B: Halftoned image (Floyd-Steinberg), C: Final VSS decryption 
The proposed real-valued VC (RVC), avoids this information and quality loss by 
taking fractional colour values directly as input.  Here, the grayscale secret image is a 
matrix of real values from 0 to 1 inclusive.  If an RGB model is used with values 
ranging from 0 to 255, the pixel at position (i, j) of colour channel h is represented as, 
 
pixel grayscale value
1
255
ijh         (1) 
where the pixel grayscale value is in 0,...,255 , i.e. the 8-bit colour value of the 
pixel in the respective channel.  Given that a colour image comprises three combined 
grayscale images (of resp. red, green and blue hues), each channel can be taken as a 
separate grayscale image. 
4.2 Contrast 
The formulae given (in, for example [Ateniese, 96:1]; [Chen, 11]) to calculate re-
constructed image contrast in VSS schemes assume binary pixel values, but these 
must be generalizes to real values.  Relative contrast,  , in binary VC is defined as 
the mean difference between black- and white-representative pixels (or subpixel ma-
trices) in the reconstruction.  In VC, if 
qual
X   and 
0
X
S  (resp. 1
X
S ) is the vector 
resulting from the OR of rows 
1 2
, ,X X etc. of 
0S  (resp. 1S ), then, 
0 1( ) ( )
X XH S H S
m


 ,      (2) 
where H(.) denotes Hamming weight. 
An RVC scheme requires basis matrices , {1,..., }iS i c , where c is the number of 
colours.  (2) can thus be generalizes as, 
1
1
1
( ) ( )
c
X X
i i
i
H S H S
m




 
        (3) 
 
 
4.3 Operations for Decryption 
4.3.1 Fuzzy OR 
RVC needs fuzzy equivalents of OR and XOR, respectively denoted fuz  and 
fuz .  The algorithms given in [Zadeh, 65] and other works on fuzzy logic are 
insuffifient.  For example, the classical fuzzy-OR definition simply takes the maxi-
mum value.  However, Figure 3 illustrates the result of stacking two regions of colour 
value 0.5.  The result of classical fuzzy-OR is the maximum, which is 0.5, but the 
stack is clearly darker than A or B.  In fact, its grayscale value is 0.75 according to 
equation (1). 
 
Figure 3:  Stack of colours A and B (here A=B=0.5) to produce colour C 
Based on this, equation (4) is given for the fuzzy OR of shadow image subpixels 
1[ , ]x y  and 2[ , ]x y : 
1 2 1 21 (1 )(1 ), [ , ]
fuz
i ib b b b b x y          (4) 
Generalised for k shares is the iterative (5): 
 
 1 1
1
... 1 (1 )(1 ) ,
( ) 1 (1 )(1 ),
, 1,..., 1, [ , ]
fuz fuz
k i i
j j j
i i
b b f b b
f b b b
i j k b x y


     
   
  
  (5) 
To prove the correctness of equations (4) and (5), let us regard a pixel of colour 
value   (e.g. 0.3) containing a ratio of ( :1 )   black to white pigments.  Clearly, 
stacking pigment values is equivalent to the binary OR operation on those values, 
since individual pigments have values 0 or 1 only (that is, a printer ink of a given 
colour is either applied, or it is not).  Superimposing a second pixel of value   (of 
pigment ratio ( :1 )   ) onto the first, there are four possibilities, summarised in 
Table 1. 
 
Pigment of   Pigment of   Probability 
0 0 (1 )(1 )    
0 1 (1 )   
1 0 (1 )   
1 1   
Table 1:  Pixel pigment superimposiiton probabilities 
The latter three are relevant, since they are the stacks resulting in an existant pig-
ment.  Summing these gives (1 ) (1 )         =     =1 (1 )(1 )    , 
and equation (4) clearly follows from this.  (5) is simply an iterative version of (4), 
taking each successive superimposition as the new   pigment, therefore its correct-
ness follows. 
4.3.2 Fuzzy XOR 
An advantage of VSS is the ability to decrypt without computation, by physically 
stacking shares.  However, the information theoretic security of VSS is also available 
while using computation.  There has been much research into applications of compu-
tational decryption, such as [Wang, 13], who use XOR to losslessly decrypt multiple 
images from one random grid scheme. 
A definition of 
1 2
fuzb b  is thus needed.  [Hernandez, 11] describes a “least sensi-
tive”  interpretation, based on the need for a definition that, given 
3 1 2
fuzb b b  , 
1 2 3( ) ( )
fuzb b b     for small  .  Here, this definition is denoted subscript LS.  
They prove that such a definition can be expressed as: 
 1 2 1 2 1 2min max( , ),max(1 )(1 ) , [ , ]
fuz
LS i ib b b b b b b x y       (6) 
4.4 RVC Schemes 
Two additional parameters are introduced in an RVC scheme (RVCS), basis matrix 
count (  ) and colour value count ( ).  These are part of the definition of a threshold 
access ( , , , )k n RVCS    based on n m  matrices , {1,2,..., }iS i   with pixel ex-
pansion m.  A Naor-Shamir VCS is seen as a special case in which 2   .  Gen-
eral access structures (see [Ateniese, 96:2]), are denoted ( , , ) RVCS   , where 
{ , }qual forb     is the access structure comprising all explicity defined qualified and 
forbidden share subsets. 
An RVCS therefore has   basis matrices, where
iS encodes mapped grayscale 
value 
1
1
i



.  For instance, in a 3-coloured scheme, the mapped values would be 0, 
0.5 and 1, each encoded by a basis matrix.  Permitted matrix element values are  
1
, {1,2,..., }
1
i
i 




.  An example of a valid a (3, 3, 3, 3)-RVCS basis is, 
 
1 2 3
.5 1 .5 0 1 0 .5 .5 0 1 .5 .5
~ 0 0 1 0 , ~ 0 1 0 0 , ~ 0 1 0 0
.5 1 1 0 1 .5 0 1 1 0 .5 1
S S S
     
     
     
          
 
. 
According to [Kafri, 87], the mean contrast for minimal qualified subsets (i.e. k=2) 
is 0.25 in this example.  This is also the contrast resulting from stacking all three 
shares.  In this case,   , i.e. the number of possible colours is equal to the number 
of basis matrices, but this need not be true.    is chosen based on the number of 
grayscale values each basis matrix element can potentially take, whereas higher val-
ues of  are chosen to create a finer grain encoding of colour ranges.  In practice, its 
maximum value is 256, wherein each RGB colour value in 0,…,255 has its own re-
spective matrix, but experiments have shown that such schemes are difficult to derive. 
The deterministic construction of these matrices remains a challenge in RVC.  
Note in [Ateniese, 96:2] the need to construct basis  0 1{ , }S S  for an (n, n)-VCS.  This 
is, as discussed in Section 4, simple for binary encoding, but not clear for real-valued 
encoding. 
Simulated annealing is therefore proposed to stochastically derive RVC basis ma-
trices for required parameters.  However, for small k, n and  , a brute-force method 
is applicable, whereby basis matrices of decreasing cost are reported. 
A candidate solution, CS, is generated according to, 
( 1) (0,1)]
~
1
mn
rand
CS



 
 
 
      (7) 
where ~  indicates vector permutation and each sequential m-sized sub-vector forms 
the next respective row of , {1,..., }iS i  .  Important to note is that row , 1,...,j j n  
 of all basis matrices in the candidate are random column permutations of each other, 
which is crucial to maintain security, as discussed in Section 5.4. 
The objective function is given in Algorithm 1.  Although it is efficient, having at 
most 2( )O n  complexity, when executed in a heuristic, the run time depends hugely 
on 
n
k
 
 
 
 and min qual .  If the latter is 2, a valid basis is normally found within 30 
seconds on a personal computer.  This is sufficient for all graph access structures. 
 
Algorithm 1:  Objective Function for Stochastic RVC Basis Generator 
Input:  CS, 
qual and preferred participant subset, pref qual   
Output:  , {1,..., }iS i  , costValue 
Procedure: 
Extract , {1,..., }iS i   from CS 
rewardConst  reward constant, punishConst punishment constant 
( ), {1,..., }prefi iH S i 

   
Put 
i  into ascending order and re-order the basis matrices  according to i . 
For each 
qualY  , do, 
   contrast of stack Y according to (5) 
 *costValue costValue rewardConst    
End For 
For each 
forbY  , do, 
   contrast of stack Y according to equation (5) 
 *costValue costValue rewardConst    
End For 
 
In conventional VC, the ith row of both basis matrices must have the same Ham-
ming weight.  In RVC, they are must be equal up to column permutation (as detailed 
in Section 6.4).  That is, 
1[ ] ~ [ ], {1,..., }, {1,..., }i iS j S j i j n   .     (8) 
Any basis not exhibiting this property is rejected in the evaluation phase, as it is 
not secure.  Indeed, this guarantees that individual shares cannot leak the secret and 
guarantees perfect security in (2, n) schemes, as the only forbidden subsets are the 
individual shares themselves. 
The annealer additionally requires a nearest neighbor and acceptance probability 
algorithm, as used in the SA architecture in Figure 5.  Both algorithms follow: 
 
Algorithm 2:  Nearest Neighbour 
Input:  
currCS CS , m, n, ,   
Output:  
newCS  
Procedure: 
Extract 
1,...,S S  from currCS  
1 ({1,..., })r rand   /RANDOM MATRIX 
2 ({1,..., })r rand n  //RANDOM ROW OF MATRIX 
3 ({1,..., })r rand m  //RANDOM SUBPIXEL IN ROW 
4 ({ 1, 1})r rand    //RANDOM DIRECTION 
({" "," "," "})method rand alter shift permutate
 
 
If method = “alter”, then, 
1 2 3[ ][ ]p S r r  , 
4
1
r
q p

 

 
If q > 1 or q < 0, then 
4 4r r ,  
End If 
4
1
r
p p

 

 and replace first instance of p with p'  in all 
2[ ], 1,...,iS r i   
Else If method = “shift”, then, 
If 
4 1r   , then, 1 12 2[ ] [ ] 1r rS r S r   //LEFT SHIFT OF ELEMENTS 
Else If 
4 1r   , then, 1 12 2[ ] [ ] 1r rS r S r   //RIGHT SHIFT OF ELEMENTS 
End If 
Else If method = “permutate”, then, 
Randomly permutate  
1 2
[ ]rS r  
End If 
 
Hence a neighbor is selected by either altering the same pixel value in the same 
row of all matrices, shifting the elements of one matrix row by one position, or ran-
domly permutating one matrix row.  Crucially, each method maintains the relation 
between all matrices that all rows , 1,...,j j n  are equal up to permutation. 
 
Algorithm 3:  Acceptance Probability 
Input:  , ,curr newE E T  
Output:  P 
Procedure: 
If 
new currE E , then, 1P   
Else, 
curr newE E
TP e

  
End If 
 
Finally, Algorithm 4 describes the use of a derived set of RVC basis matrices to 
encode a secret image into shares. 
Algorithm 4:  Encoding a Secret Image 
Input:  , , 1,...,iS i   
Output:  , 1,...,i i n  
Procedure: 
1
, 1,...,
1
i
i 

 
 



  
For each pixel at position x,y in , do, 
[ , ]s x y  
{ : min( )}i ii i s s     
iB S  
For 1,...,i n , do, 
[ ]V B i  
M V  reshaped  to a p q  matrix, where p q  
Place subpixel block M at position x,y in 
i
 
End For 
End For 
 
Crucially, a common problem in binary VC is the reversal of colours in the recon-
struction (producing a negative image).  This is exacerbated in RVC, resulting in 
(seemingly) unpredictable permuations of reconstructed grayscale values.  It is for 
this reason that the collection of RVC basis matrices must be reordered to optimize 
for the visual quality of a “preferred” share stack, 
pref .  The simulated annealing 
algorithm is illustrated in Figure 5.  Given the superior quality using XOR,  fuz
LS  is 
defined using equation (6) to improve the contrast of the decoded secret. 
Algorithm 1 was applied to evolve  the (2, 3, 10, 255)-RVCS below (each element 
rounded to two decimal places), with m=4, producing the shadow images in Figure 4.  
 
1
0.99 0.59 0.01 0.76
~ 0.99 0.03 0.06 0.39 ,
0.85 0.45 0.03 0.67
S
 
 
 
  
2
0.59 0.01 0.99 0.76
~ 0.39 0.03 0.99 0.06 ,
0.85 0.03 0.45 0.67
S
 
 
 
  
3
0.59 0.76 0.01 0.99
~ 0.39 0.06 0.03 0.99 ,
0.03 0.67 0.45 0.85
S
 
 
 
  
 
4
0.01 0.59 0.76 0.99
~ 0.06 0.39 0.03 0.99 ,
0.45 0.67 0.03 0.85
S
 
 
 
  
5
0.76 0.99 0.59 0.01
~ 0.06 0.99 0.03 0.39 ,
0.45 0.67 0.03 0.85
S
 
 
 
  
6
0.59 0.01 0.76 0.99
~ 0.99 0.39 0.06 0.03 ,
0.85 0.45 0.67 0.03
S
 
 
 
  
  
7
0.59 0.01 0.99 0.76
~ 0.06 0.99 0.03 0.39 ,
0.45 0.85 0.67 0.03
S
 
 
 
  
8
0.59 0.01 0.99 0.76
~ 0.06 0.03 0.39 0.99 ,
0.67 0.85 0.45 0.03
S
 
 
 
  
9
0.76 0.01 0.59 0.99
~ 0.03 0.39 0.99 0.06 ,
0.67 0.85 0.45 0.03
S
 
 
 
  
 
10
0.76 0.01 0.99 0.59
~ 0.03 0.99 0.39 0.06
0.85 0.03 0.45 0.67
S
 
 
 
  
 
 
A.   B.   C.  D.   
E.  F.  G.  H.   
I.  J.  K.  
Figure 4: A-C:  Share 1 to 3. D-G:  Fuzzy-OR stacks of share subsets (1,2), (1,3), (2,3), 
(1,2,3). H-K:  Fuzzy-XOR stacks of the same share subsets. 
 Figure 5:  Procedure the SA construction of RVC schemes. 
 
 
 
It is clear here that, as in binary VC, XOR is superior to OR in decoding, as it elim-
inates redundant dark pixels.  Note the reordering of colours resulting in loss of quali-
ty particulary in F and J above, whereas D and H are stacked subsets of shares in 
pref . 
5 Results and Discussion 
5.1 Parameter Constraints 
Parameters   and   can be independently set.  Indeed, any number of matrices 
and any number of shadow pixel values can be selected, ensuring: 
 1( ) ( )
X X
i iH S H S  , where {1,..., 1}, quali X   .   (9) 
However, it turns out that not all combinations of  ,   and m yield valid 
schemes.  Obviously, it is preferable to have pixel expansion m as small as possible, 
resulting in smaller share sizes, but there exists a lower bound.  For example, a (2, 2)-
RVCS with 5, 2, 4m     has five basis matrices, which are stacked to produce 
five four-digit binary vectors.  Each vector must have a different Hamming weight to 
satisfy equation (9), but the only possible Hamming weights here are 1, 2 ,3 or 4, so a 
valid scheme is impossible.  (Zero is clearly not a valid Hamming weight, as it im-
plies a matrix comprising only zeros.) 
A valid scheme therefore clearly requires that m  , but ensuring security 
through equation (8) places further restrictions on the possible combinations and min-
imal m.  Experiments with the above parameters indicate that, in this case, 8m  .  An 
example is the (2, 2, 5, 2)-RVCS basis, 
 
1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
~ ,
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
S
 
 
 
2
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
~ ,
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
S
 
 
 
 
3
1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
~ ,
1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
S
 
 
 
4
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
~ ,
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
S
 
 
 
5
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
~
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
S
 
 
 
 
 
According to equation (3), this yields relative contrast 0.267  .  Interestingly 
and ironically, 10m   produced the better quality 13  . 
However, if,   increases to to 3 or 4, schemes exist with 4m   and 3m  , re-
spectively.  An example of the latter is, 
 
1
0.67 1 0
~ ,
0.33 1 0
S
 
 
 
2
0.67 1 0
~ ,
0 1 0.33
S
 
 
 
3
0 0.67 1
~ ,
0.33 0 1
S
 
 
 
 
4
0 1 0.67
~ ,
0.33 0 1
S
 
 
 
5
0.67 0 1
~
0 1 0.33
S
 
 
 
 
 
with 0.296   according to equation (3). 
5.2 RVCS Encryptions and Decryptions 
Here, the basis matrices and resulting shadow images and stacks are demonstrated 
for two full colour images.  The first is a (2, 2, 10, 10)-RVCS with m=4.  The sto-
chastic algorithm produced the following basis with 0.272   under OR-based 
stacking. 
 
1
0 0.89 1 0.33
~ ,
0 0.89 0.56 0.11
S
 
 
 
2
0 1 0.89 0.33
~ ,
0 0.89 0.11 0.56
S
 
 
 
3
0.33 0 0.89 1
~ ,
0.56 0.11 0 0.89
S
 
 
 
4
0 1 0.89 0.33
~ ,
0.11 0 0.89 0.56
S
 
 
 
5
1 0.33 0 0.89
~ ,
0.11 0 0.56 0.89
S
 
 
 
6
1 0.33 0.89 0
~ ,
0.56 0.89 0 0.11
S
 
 
 
7
0 0.89 0.33 1
~ ,
0.89 0.11 0 0.56
S
 
 
 
8
0 1 0.33 0.89
~ ,
0.89 0 0.11 0.56
S
 
 
 
9
0.89 0 0.33 1
~ ,
0.11 0.56 0.89 0
S
 
 
 
10
0.89 0.33 0 1
~
0 0.56 0.89 0.11
S
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the resulting shares and stacks using fuzzy OR and XOR, after en-
coding the “earth” image using the above basis. 
 
A.  B.  C.   
D.  E.   
 
Figure 6:  (2, 2, 10, 10)-RVCS, 4, 0.272m   .  A: Secret image, B: 
1
, C: 
2
,  
D: 
1 2
fuz
 , E: 
1 2
fuz
LS
  
 
Here, pref qual   , since there exists only one stack from two shares.  Figure 6D 
is the result of OR-stacking the shares, but with the luxury of computation to decrypt, 
least sensitive fuzzy XOR can be used to reveal the reconstruction in Figure 6E.  
Figure 7 shows the encryption of a second full colour test image into a (2, 4, 20, 
20)-RVCS, along with fuzzy-OR decryptions of minimal qualified subsets.  The basis 
used is, 
10.95 0.16 1 0.11
0.79 0.63 0.84 0.05
~ ,
0.47 0.79 0 0.89
0.95 0.21 1 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
0.16 1 0.95 0.11
0.05 0.79 0.84 0.63
~ ,
0 0.47 0.89 0.79
0.21 0.95 1 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
1 0.95 0.11 0.16
0.63 0.84 0.05 0.79
~ ,
0.47 0.79 0 0.89
0.95 0.21 1 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
0.95 0.16 1 0.11
0.63 0.84 0.79 0.05
~ ,
0.47 0.79 0.89 0
1 0.21 0.21 0.95
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
0.95 0.11 1 0.16
0.63 0.05 0.79 0.84
~ ,
0.79 0.89 0.47 0
0.21 0.21 0.95 1
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
0.95 0.16 0.11 1
0.84 0.05 0.79 0.63
~ ,
0 0.89 0.79 0.47
0.95 1 0.21 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
1 0.95 0.11 0.16
0.63 0.84 0.79 0.05
~ ,
0.79 0.89 0 0.47
1 0.95 0.21 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
0.16 0.11 0.95 1
0.05 0.79 0.84 0.63
~ ,
0.89 0 0.47 0.79
0.21 0.21 0.95 1
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
1 0.11 0.95 0.16
0.63 0.05 0.79 0.84
~ ,
0 0.47 0.79 0.89
0.21 0.95 0.21 1
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
1 0.16 0.95 0.11
0.63 0.05 0.79 0.84
~ ,
0.47 0.89 0.79 0
1 0.95 0.21 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
0.11 1 0.16 0.95
0.63 0.05 0.79 0.84
~ ,
0.89 0 0.47 0.79
1 0.95 0.21 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
0.16 0.11 0.95 1
0.63 0.79 0.84 0.05
~ ,
0.79 0 0.89 0.47
0.21 0.21 0.95 1
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
0.95 0.16 0.11 1
0.05 0.63 0.84 0.79
~ ,
0.79 0.47 0.89 0
1 0.21 0.21 0.95
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
0.16 0.95 1 0.11
0.63 0.05 0.79 0.84
~ ,
0.47 0.79 0 0.89
1 0.95 0.21 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
15
0.16 0.95 1 0.11
0.63 0.79 0.05 0.84
~ ,
0 0.89 0.47 0.79
1 0.95 0.21 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
16
0.95 0.16 0.11 1
0.79 0.63 0.84 0.05
~ ,
0.79 0.47 0.89 0
0.21 0.95 0.21 1
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
1 0.16 0.11 0.95
0.63 0.84 0.79 0.05
~ ,
0.89 0.47 0.79 0
0.21 0.21 0.95 1
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
0.95 0.11 0.16 1
0.63 0.84 0.79 0.05
~ ,
0 0.47 0.89 0.79
0.95 0.21 1 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
19
0.16 0.95 0.11 1
0.79 0.63 0.84 0.05
~ ,
0.47 0 0.89 0.79
0.21 1 0.95 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
0.16 0.11 1 0.95
0.79 0.84 0.05 0.63
~
0.89 0.47 0 0.79
1 0.21 0.95 0.21
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
A.  B.  C.  D.    
E.   F.    G.  
Figure 7:  (2, 4, 20, 20)-RVCS, 4, 0.14m   .  A: Secret image, B-G: All fuzzy-XOR 2-stacks 
Figure 8  gives the equivalent fuzzy-XOR stacks. 
 
A.  B. C.   
D.  E.  F.  
Figure 8:  (2, 4, 20, 20)-RVCS,  A-F:  All possible 2-stacks combined using fuzzy-XOR 
In this case, {1, 2}
pref
  , rendering the correct colour order for 1 2{ , }
fuz   but 
the aforementioned problem of colour reordering is blatant in the above example. 
So far, only graph access structure basis matrices have been obtained.  In our pa-
per, [Buckley, 13], genetic algorithms were used to evolve binary basis matrices and 
limitations were conceded due to combinatorial complexity.  The problem is exacer-
bated for real-valued matrices, as the possible number of combinations vastly increas-
es. 
5.3 Comparative Analysis 
The findings of this study are compared to other key studies in terms of non-binary 
encryption capability (i.e. pixel values and basis matrix count), ability to decrypt us-
ing both OR and XOR, pre-processing, access structures, perfect information theoretic 
security and computational cost. 
    Stacking results (of shares 1 and 2) are compared with those of conventional VC.  
Results are compared based on peak-to-signal noise ratio (PSNR) calculations, begin-
ning with mean squared error, which is used to derive PSNR, i.e., 
2
1 1
1
( )
w h
channel xy xy
x y
MSE
wh  
  ' ,
3
10 10
1
20 log 255 10 log
3
channel
channel
MSE
PSNR




 (10) 
where w and h are the image dimensions, 
xy
is the respective colour value (on a re-
spective channel) for the decoded image, and likewise 
xyI'  for the decoded image. 
Peak-to-signal noise ratio, however, is only a “flat” measure based on average dis-
tortion across the altered image.  As described in [Wang, 04], human vision is highly 
adapted to extracting structural information from an image.  To take advantage of this, 
they proposed a Structural Simiarlarity (SSIM) index.  Here, a map of similarity met-
rics is calculated on square-sized blocks ,x y '  .  A block size of 10 is used in 
this analysis.  The map is calculated as follows, and the map average to arrive at the 
final index value. 
  
    
1 2
2 2
2
2 2 cov( , )
, 100.
std( ) std( )
map map
x y c x y c
SSIM SSIM SSIM
x y x y c
 
 
   
    (11) 
where 7 2 7 2
1 2
(0.01.2 ) , (0.03.2 )c c   and overbar denotes mean. 
 
 
Unrestricted 
non-binary 
values 
No. of 
basis 
matrices 
OR and 
XOR de-
cryption 
Halftoning not 
required 
Threshold 
access 
General 
access 
[Naor, 94] No 2 Yes No Yes No 
[Naor, 96] No 2 No No No No 
[Ateniese, 96:2] No 2 Yes No Yes Yes 
[Verheul, 97] No c Yes No Yes No 
[Lin, 04] Yes 2 No Yes Yes Yes 
[Blundo, 01] No Up to 5 Yes No Yes Yes 
[Liu, 10] No 2 Yes No Yes No 
[Wu, 13] No n/a No No Yes No 
[Christy, 15] No n/a Yes No Yes No 
[Sugawari, 15] Yes n/a n/a n/a Yes Yes 
RVC Yes 
2 or 
more 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 2:  Comparative analysis 1 
 
 
Perfect inf. 
sec. security 
Comp. Cost based on  
n
k
 
 
 
 or min( )qual
 
XOR Decoded 
PSNR 
XOR Decoded 
SSIM 
[Naor, 94] Yes 2( )O n  4-9 0-13% 
[Naor, 96] Yes 2( )O n  5-10 0-16% 
[Ateniese, 96:2] Yes 2( )O n  4-9 0-13% 
[Verheul, 97] Yes 2( )O n  6-11 0-13% 
[Lin, 04] Yes 2( )O n  n/a n/a 
[Blundo, 01] Yes 2( )O n  <10 10-20% 
[Liu, 10] Yes 2( )O n  <12 5-20% 
[Wu, 13] Yes 2( )O n  n/a n/a 
[Christy, 15] No n/a (stochastic) n/a n/a 
[Sugawari, 15] Yes Unknown 
n/a (only simple 
images) 
n/a (only simple 
images) 
RVC Yes 
2
( )O n  per SA itera-
tion 
9-13 5-50% 
Table 3:  Comparative analysis 2 
 
The OR and XOR stacking results of binary and real-valued VC are compared for 
four grayscale images (A-D) of differing entropy values and colour distributions, as 
well as three full-colour images (E-G).  The test images are given in Table 4, where 
entropy is given by, 
2
0 255, 0
100 log
8
i
i i
i
E

 
  



,      (12) 
where 
i
  is the number of pixels of the ith grayscale colour. 
 
 
Test Image Colour Distribution 
Percentage 
Entropy 
Image A
 
 
 
37.3 
Image B
 
 
 
71.3 
Image C
 
 
 
94 
Image D
 
 
 
97.5 
  
Image E
 
 
 
50.8 
Image F
 
 
 
74.6 
Image G
 
 
 
97.1 
Table 4:  Test images and colour analyses 
Each image was encrypted into a pair of binary, as well as real-valued shadow images 
using a (2, 2, 10, 30)-RVC with 4m  .  Table 5 compares the resulting binary versus 
fuzzy decryptions on, respectively, the binary and real-valued shares for both binary 
operations. 
  
Img 
VC Binary-OR 
Stacks 
RVC Fuzzy-
OR Stacks 
VC Binary-
XOR Stacks 
RVC Fuzzy-
XOR Stacks 
A 
    
B 
    
C 
    
D 
    
E 
    
F 
    
G 
    
Table 5: Binary vs Real-valued VC decrypted images using the OR operations 
In each case, similarity of the decrypted image to the secret image was calculated 
in terms of PSNR and SSIM, the results of which follow in Table 6, and in Table 7 
are the percentage increases in reconstructed image similarity of RVC over conven-
tional VC.  The results there clearly incidicate improved quality of reconstructed im-
ages using the RVC approach, as opposed to conventional VC.  Grayscale images 
with few colours or a smooth colour value distribution produced the most significant-
ly improved PSNR and SSIM metrics, although the chaotically distributed Image D 
also showed lesser improvements in real-valued versus binary VC decryption. 
 
  (Peak to Signal Noise Ratio %, Structural Similarity %) 
Image 
binary VC 
using OR 
binary VC 
using XOR 
RVC using 
OR 
RVC using 
XOR 
A (5.2, 1.0) (6.4, 11.2) (6.1, 5.1) (11, 25) 
B (5.9, 3.1) (5.6, 6.6) (7.3, 6.1) (11, 23.3) 
C (6.0, 2.7) (4.9, 4.0) (8.7, 8.3) (11.8, 20.8) 
D (5.4, 13.2) (6.5, 31.3) (6.2, 15.2) (10.4, 49.0) 
E (4.0, 0.7) (9.1, 45.9) (4.3, 3.2) (12.3, 18.3) 
F (5.7, 0.8) (6.5, 1.5) (6.4, 1.4) (9.5, 5.2) 
G (5.7, 4.0) (6.1, 9.2) (6.6, 5.4) (10.4, 22.7) 
Table 6:  PSNR of binary vs real-valued VC with parameters (2, 2, 10, 255), m=4 
Interestingly, there is a broad increase in quality improvement with higher entropy 
values, with some obvious exceptions.  Consider the low entropy colour Image E.  
Here, there is a huge improvement in OR-based stacking, but XOR-based stacking 
exhibits a decrease in quality versus conventional VC.  However, in this case, the 
above metric is misleading, as it is clear in Table 5 that  fuzzy-XOR decrypts the 
white background as an average gray colour, as opposed to binary-XOR, which retains 
the pure white.  Since there are so many white pixels in the secret image, this change 
produces the significant error value. 
Images A to G were then encrypted into a (2, 4, 30, 30)-RVC, producing the OR 
and XOR reconstructions in Figure 6 for {1, 2}
pref
  .  The overall increases in PSNR 
and SSIM are summarized in Table 7. 
 
  
A.  B.  C.  D.  
 E.  F.  G.  H.   
I.  J.  K.  L.   
M.  N.  
Figure 9: Fuzzy-OR and –XOR reconstructions of Images A-G from a (2, 4, 30, 255)-RVC 
  
Mean Percentage Improvement in PSNR and 
SSIM 
Scheme 
OR 
PSNR 
XOR 
PSNR 
OR 
SSIM 
XOR 
SSIM 
(2, 2, 10, 255) 19 74 180 164 
(2, 4, 30, 255) 59 73 52 269 
Table 7:  Improvements in similarity metrics using binary vs real-valued VC with parame-
ters (2, 2, 10, 255), m=4 
The improved decrypted image quality from using real-valued VC is clear here, 
particularly for computational XOR decryption.  It is surprising, in fact, that the im-
provements gained from RVC for this access structure are, on average, 80% higher 
than for the previous one. 
5.4 Security 
Information theoretic security of conventional VC relies on the requirement, when 
calculating a scheme’s basis matrices, that 
0 1
( [ ]) ( [ ]) {1,..., }H S j H S j j n   .  Equivalent-
ly, 
0 1
[ ] [ ]S j S j  , because the sum and Hamming weight of a binary vector are 
equal.  For the construction of the subpixel matrix at coordinate ( , )x y  in the shadow 
image held by the jth participant, the following procedure is followed: 
1. Select basis matrix [ ],
i xy
S j i  , 2. Randomly permutate [ ]
i
S j , 3. Reshape [ ]
i
S j  
into rectangular matrix M, and 4. Place M at coordinate ( , )x y  in 
j
. 
An adversary possessing a share might want to retrieve the secret from that share.  
He must therefore retrieve 
xy
 from M.  However, step 2 clearly renders this impossi-
ble due to Hamming weight equality.  For example, if  
0
[1] 1 0 1 0S   and 
 
1
[1] 0 0 1 1S  , both could be permutated to become 
 
0 1
0 1
[1] [1] 0 1 1 0
1 0
S S M 
 
 
 
.  Hence the procedure is irreversible. 
A set of RVC matrices is non-binary, meaning Hamming weight is inapplicable.  
Instead, equality of row sums might be considered preferable. For example, 
     
1 2 3
[1] 0 1 0.5 0.5 , [1] 1 0 1 0 , [1] 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5S S S   .  However, steps 2 
and 3 do not conceal the mapping from 
,x y
I  to M, because the distribution of colour 
values in  the resulting subpixel matrices differ. 
To maintain information theoretic security in graph access structures, it is neces-
sary that, given j, all [ ]
i
S j  are equal up to permutation, as in equation (8).  In non-
graph access structures, ie. (k, n)-VC, 3k  , one must also ensure that no subset of 
shares 
forb
X   can access any part of the secret when they are stacked according to 
equations (4) and (5).  Here, it is necessary that 
1 2
~ ~ ... ~
X X X
S S S

, i.e. all (OR’d or 
XOR’d) stacks of all subsets are equal up to column permutation. 
As noted in Section 4.4, the candidate solution is initialised such that row 
, 1, ...,i i n  in all matrices are equal up to permutation and the only change to the solu-
tion comes about using Algorithm 1.  Furthermore, this algorithm guarantees to main-
tain the quality up to permutation, hence information theoretic security in the final 
constructed RVC scheme is guaranteed for graph access structures.  (As discussed, 
non-graph access is not considered in this paper.) 
6 Conclusion and Ongoing Research 
There is little prior research into the direct encoding of colours into visual secret 
sharing schemes, as opposed to preprocessing the secret image to reduce it to binary 
or using purely computational methods.  This is the first study that removes all restric-
tions from colour values that can be fed directly into a visual cryptographic scheme 
construction algorithm for schemes permitted decryption using human vision.  In this 
paper, an objective function has been given to stochastically derive valid real-valued 
basis matrices, in which fractions between 0 and 1 represent grayscale values from 0 
to 255.  In effect, this is the first true colour VC methodology 
No halftoning is required, retaining more of the information from the original gray-
scale or colour image.  This producing a better quality reconstruction evidenced here 
in the fuzzy OR and XOR decryptions of various images of differing entropies and 
colour distributions, in different access structures.  Real-valued VC has been com-
pared with conventional binary VC in terms of peak-to-signal noise ratio and struc-
tural similarity index, and in the vast majority of cases, there is a significant (indeed, 
in many cases, a dramatic) improvement in image reconstruction quality.  The mean 
improvement in quality for OR-based stacking in the examples in Section 5 (taking 
both PSNR and SSIM into account) is 86%, and that for computational (XOR-based) 
stacking is 145%! 
This proposal is an entirely new type of VSS presententing new computer scientific 
and mathematical challenges.  The problem of colour reordering in RVC has been 
demonstrated in Section 5.  The equivalent problem in conventional VC is production 
of a negative image, but this is only a problem when using pixel expansion reduced 
basis matrices.  Matrices with maximal expansion, produced using the cumulative 
array method [Ateniese, 96:2], although extremely space-inefficient, do not suffer 
from this effect.  It is therefore a pressing challenge to devise an equivalent technique 
for generating (k, n,  , ) schemes. 
A further unknown is the precise relationship between the bounds on parameters k, 
n,  ,  and m.  A governing system of formulae would help to calculate the feasibil-
ity of a given scheme, without having to infer infeasibility from the lack of successful 
experimental results.  For example, if a high-entropy image needs to be encoded into 
a scheme with a low pixel expansion, it would be useful to derive theoretical bounds 
on the number of colour values. 
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